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Hybridity is an umbrella term that can be applied to a multitude of organizational phe-
nomena. They have in common that formerly separate, distinct elements are being 
combined: social and economic (social entrepreneurship) in terms of objectives, pub-
lic and private organizations (quangos) in regard to legal status, or formal and informal 
organizational cultures (cooperatives emerging from social movements). For the most 
part, the emergent research on hybridity focuses on its alleged positive aspects: It is 
said to increase competitiveness and to provide broader community engagement and 
support at the same time (Smith, 2010) and to play an enabling role by filling institu-
tional voids (Mair & Marti, 2009). What is more, hybrid organizations and the indi-
viduals steering them, driven by an unfamiliar combination of motivations, are 
ascribed a power of transformation, with an often very distinct emphasis (Bornstein, 
2007; Koppell, 2001). Finally, it is suggested that hybrids’ combination of a strong 
ideological foundation with the provision of services acts as a catalyst for social 
change (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005).
However, critical voices in view of hybridity are on the rise and challenge the posi-
tively charged discourse surrounding the phenomenon (Dey, 2006). They describe 
hybridity as self-reflexive, as a field that floats toward a predetermined state, which is 
directed by the individual agendas of involved actors rather than based on facts 
(Nicholls, 2010). Certain buzzwords are being used to keep the hybridity agenda “dan-
gerous” (Steyaert & Dey, 2010). In view of the increasing empirical research, hybrid 
organizations’ significance is put into question, specifically in terms of the number of 
organizations and the size of the organizational field, which is overestimated in policy 
talk if compared to actual figures (Teasdale, Lyon, & Baldock, 2013). Irrespective of 
these debates, no systematic assessments are available that go beyond a particular 
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case, field, or country, and any analysis across cases remains all too rare with very few 
exceptions (Kerlin, 2009, 2010). What is more, the existing exceptions mostly focus 
on conditions for the emergence of hybridity rather than its effects. This limits our 
understanding of hybridity generally.
This special issue of American Behavioral Scientist seeks to further the compara-
tive perspective on hybridity across the selected set of articles included here. Most of 
the articles apply a welfare regime lens on the phenomenon and thereby explicitly take 
into account its context specificity. The contributions seek to enhance the study of 
hybridity in various respects by providing insights on many open questions. For 
instance, which concepts of governance are particularly useful in investigating hybrid-
ity (see Schiersmann’s contribution for inputs on network and multilevel governance)? 
Which broader organizational processes and concepts are strongly linked to the phe-
nomenon (see Pestoff’s contribution for the enabling effects of coproduction and 
Balarin’s contribution for downsides in terms of commodification)? How does hybrid-
ity relate to welfare ideologies (see Garrow and Hasenfeld’s contribution on neo-liber-
alism)? How does hybridity relate to existing research on fields and organizations that 
have been more intensely studied (see Smith’s contribution on the nexus between 
hybridity and nonprofit theories)? Last, is hybridity an emergent and stable concept or 
one that is actually in decline (see Grohs’ contribution)?
The aim of this introductory article is to merge theoretical reasoning with insights 
from the contributions against the most prominent welfare system classifications. 
These include the worlds of welfare capitalism, the social origins theory, and the vari-
eties of capitalism approaches. Against this background, the special issue provides 
readers from the United States, Europe, and beyond with valuable insights on hybrid-
ity from a comparative welfare perspective.
The Comparative Perspective: How Welfare Reforms 
Affect Hybridity
Typically, social welfare provision and education involve some third sector engage-
ment, and even if not, these fields are usually marked by some sort of civic involve-
ment, voluntary engagement, or both. At the same time, these fields and the welfare 
state as a whole are subjected to increasing influence from market principles. Both 
trends combined lead to hybridity in organizational design but also in organizational 
practices. Not all of these effects are favorable. The new public management (NPM) 
agenda (Hood, 1995), for instance, has played a major role in incorporating market 
rationales in public procurement and performance-oriented management practices in 
welfare providers—be they public or private. These performance criteria comprise 
cost savings, operational efficiency, and intervention effectiveness—following the 
rationale of cost versus benefit. Thus, the NPM agenda has fostered what may be 
referred to as “economization.” The term can be used to “denote the processes through 
which behaviours, organizations, institutions and, more generally, objects are consti-
tuted as being ‘economic’” (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010, p. 2). Market principles referred 
to by Çalışkan and Callon as being part of economization or the closely connected 
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urge for privatization of services as such are not negative in themselves. However, 
economization may give overriding weight to economic rationales and institutional 
logics. It is thereby likely to destroy the welfare hybridity it has initially created by 
invading public administration and social services. This is because hybridity is charac-
terized by the persistent engagement of various stakeholders with Hirschman-type 
(1970) agencies that pursue multiple objectives with varying intensity. Only two con-
ditions—multiple stakeholders and multiple objectives—can guarantee that a hybrid 
organizational nature is preserved over time.
Dominant economic forces may instead lead to the commodification of social ser-
vices or education and undermine the norms and values that are inherent to them 
(which is highlighted as a reason for the primary engagement of nonprofits in these 
fields; e.g., Anheier, 2014). A potential consequential effect of economization is politi-
cal clientelism, which refers to a particularistic political preference for the demands of 
dominant stakeholder groups. Dominance is defined not by mere size but rather by the 
stakeholder’s status, financial capacity, or political power. This dominance of particu-
lar stakeholders leads to the neglect of minority interests and thereby undermines the 
very essence of social services and violates their potential hybrid nature. Clientelism 
is often “built around asymmetric but mutually beneficial and open-ended transactions 
and predicated on the differential control by social actors over the access and control 
of resources in stratified societies” (Roniger, 1994, p. 3). These circumstances are 
most likely to be found in developing countries but can also occur in welfare systems 
of industrialized nations. Both commodification and clientelism can lead hybrid orga-
nizations to dissolution by provoking mission drift to a single purpose, eliminating 
stakeholder influence or effectuating organizational decline altogether (independent of 
their “sector affiliation,” i.e., social economy, public or commercial).
The tendencies resulting from the NPM agenda are subject to a layering of further 
policy streams (Wegrich, 2011). According to Wegrich, post-NPM policy reforms 
have stressed “smart” regulation, which is characterized by the deliberate transfer of 
responsibilities from the state to a diverse set of actors. Since this includes not only 
private commercial providers but also nonprofits and civil society more generally—
calling upon the self-regulating capacity of societies1—this cooperative logic is some-
what at odds with pure market principles. Although the term post-NPM evokes the 
impression of a chronological order and clear-cut lines of separation, the current pol-
icy landscape across all welfare states tends to be characterized by a mixture of partly 
divergent trends. Against the background of ongoing processes that follow the logic of 
NPM, the formation of network coalitions between stakeholders plays a major role. 
Phenomena that might be associated with these new constellations in social welfare 
provision and education are multilevel governance as well as network governance. 
The first form of governance refers to the vertical architecture of institutional bodies 
or institution-organization constellations and the importance of multiple layers of 
decision making (Benz, 2007). The second form, network governance, refers to hori-
zontal multistakeholder relations (Powell, 1990). Both forms of governance may 
increase the general legitimacy of decisions and actions due to the increased multitude 
of actors involved in rule-setting or service provision; however, the legitimacy 
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formation process is likely to be accordingly more complex. This may reduce organi-
zational effectiveness and bureaucratic efficiency.
Coproduction is another concept that fits the post-NPM agenda well, as it refers to 
the involvement of citizens, patients, users, or customers in any equivalent sense in the 
provision of public services (Parks et al., 1981). Although coproduction is usually 
treated as a positive concept due to the empowerment of citizens or the enhancement 
of user centrality (Carr, 2012), it may also put organizations under increasing coordi-
native pressure, in particular when organizations shift positions with regard to sector 
intersections in the wake of hybridity.
It is obvious that we will not expect to find the organizational phenomena just 
described or the (divergent) trends producing them in a state of harmony. To develop 
our understanding of hybridity in empirical research further, the core organizational 
features and practices have to be connected to the larger welfare context. To put it 
otherwise, hybridity depends on the nexus between the traits of organizational entities 
or organizational fields and the welfare system surrounding them.
Alternative Welfare Classifications
At present, there is a tendency to discuss local welfare systems (Andreotti, Mingione, 
& Polizzi, 2012) rather than national regimes because the differences between regions 
and localities within countries are becoming more and more extreme to the extent that 
we cannot easily compare, for example, rural and urban settings. The particularities of 
the latter have recently received major attention.2 The direction of current welfare 
trends is, however, uncertain at best, depending on both the service field in question 
and the diversity of standpoints taken into account. This leads Ranci and Pavolini 
(2013) to assert the formation of two very different long-term care systems across all 
of Europe, despite having previously observed general convergence in the same 
field—considering only a smaller set of Western European countries (Pavolini & 
Ranci, 2008). Taking this into account, there is no reason to assume that we cannot 
learn from drawing on classic welfare state conceptions to study the context specificity 
of hybridity as an emergent global phenomenon.
The study of social welfare systems and economies has undergone major shifts. In 
his seminal contribution, Esping-Andersen (1990) proposed three major types of wel-
fare regimes across the world. These have been complemented by the inclusion of, for 
example, a specific southern welfare state concept at later points (as discussed in Arts 
& Gelissen, 2002). Most of these types can, however, be related to Esping-Andersen’s 
use of two parameters to explain the shape of the welfare state: (1) decommodifica-
tion, which refers to the extent to which public services are not treated as a commodity 
and traded on markets; and (2) stratification, which refers to the power distance 
between members and groups of society. To link this more explicitly to the country-
specific examples of hybridity in this special issue, we use existing country classifica-
tions or complement these by including further insights from current research on 
national welfare regimes. This results in the allocation illustrated in Table 1.
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It is quite evident that the NPM and post-NPM reform schemes have played out 
differently, depending on the initial welfare state conception in the cases at hand, pro-
ducing policy contradictions and layering. It will be particularly interesting to see how 
these affect hybridity as an organizational and field phenomenon. Discourses on social 
enterprise, in which the very terminology explicitly points to hybridity, are currently 
undoubtedly most pronounced in the United Kingdom and the United States, with 
other countries only gradually engaging with the concept. This squares with the clas-
sification above, since we would assume that people more readily accept enterprising 
entities in social service provision in states that are characterized by a comparatively 
high degree of stratification and commodification. However, if we add further eco-
nomic push factors, such as the NPM agenda, we would expect to find not only more 
social enterprises in these liberal states but also more such organizations that are sub-
ject to mission drift and eventually dissolve to nonhybridity by eliminating the multi-
plicity of objectives, often simultaneously inviting single stakeholder dominance.
Peru then becomes a related but distinct case. Wood and Gough (2006) described the 
state of Latin American welfare in general as “liberal-informal,” while highlighting that 
the states in the southern cone are more like the formal welfare states found in Europe. 
Especially in the northern states of Latin America, including Peru, a large part of social 
welfare depends on less formal, community-based processes. Wood and Gough thus 
advocate shifting the social policy focus from decommodification to de-clientelization, 
which has to be overcome to move to a more formal state. We referred earlier to how 
commodification and clientelism are related; formalization only adds one more variable 
to the complex set of forces that hybridity is subject to through welfare reforms. In 
contexts where stratification and commodification are low, we would assume fewer 
hybrids but potentially more stable and established ones, such as in Sweden.
These considerations regarding stability and stakeholder engagement evoke ques-
tions about how hybridity might relate to the standard organizational and institutional 
structure governing social service provision and education. To explore such questions, 
we draw on a more recent welfare classification, the social origins theory (Salamon & 
Anheier, 1998), which focuses on the relation between the state and civil society, 
approximated by its organizational embodiment in the nonprofit sector. The two cen-
tral dimensions of the nonprofit regime typology are (1) national social welfare spend-
ing and (2) the size of the nonprofit sector (see Table 2). The classification is 
Table 1. Decommodification and Stratification in National Contexts.
Decommodification
Stratification Low High
Low Conservative: Germany Social-democratic: Sweden
High Liberal: United States, United Kingdom, 
Peru (liberal-informal)
 
Note. Based on Arts & Gelissen (2002); Esping-Andersen (1990); Wood & Gough (2006).
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conceptually related to Esping-Andersen’s conception but explicitly stresses the nexus 
between available financial resources and the operational entities of welfare provision 
(be it in terms of products, services, or less formalized actions like advocacy). It 
thereby relates to economic theories (Weisbrod, 1988) that seek to explain govern-
ment–nonprofit connections (Anheier, 2010), which are interpreted as principal-agent, 
competitive, or complementary relations.
First of all, this classification supports a point that has initially been taken as a 
given: the preference of liberal institutional contexts for hybridity. The argument is as 
follows: Where the nonprofit sector—that is, the dominant and established welfare 
providers as well as social welfare spending, that is, the resources that these can tap 
into—is large, hybridity in service fields will be low. The reason is the prevalence of 
established players that can rely on stable funding streams from state sources. This 
would quite accurately, though simplistically, describe the situation in Germany. 
However, where state resources are scarce but the sector is similarly large, as is the 
case in the United Kingdom, we can expect to find a more dynamic provider landscape 
(with a respectively higher rate of organizational births and deaths).
These organizational constellations have significant implications for governance. 
In a dense institutional social welfare landscape, in terms of both providers and (finan-
cial) regulation, hybridity would add a profound degree of complexity. It would do so 
in two respects: It would challenge established welfare structures, and it would make 
regulatory control more difficult as hybridity often cuts across the borders of organi-
zational legal forms, social insurance pillars, and social service fields (Bode & Evers, 
2005). Governance of hybridity in such contexts would thus benefit from multilevel 
governance approaches, whereas this is less likely the case in more fluid and less regu-
lated welfare state conceptions. The (in)formality question raised in the Peruvian case 
comes in here too. Where hybridity is supported by neither a strong organizational nor 
a strong institutional infrastructure, it will be less prone to commodification but more 
so to clientelism, with unfavorable conditions for minority groups. This effect is prob-
ably even more pronounced where the political influence of state power (less so its 
market influence; see below) not only is great but has been authoritarian as in Peru.
Table 2. Government Spending and Nonprofit Sector in National Contexts.
Government Social Welfare Spending
Scale of Nonprofit Sector Low High
Small Statist: Perua Social democratic: Sweden
Large Liberal: United Kingdom, 
United States
Corporatist: Germany
Note. Based on Anheier (2010); Salamon & Anheier (1998); Salamon & Sokolowski (2004); Segura-
Ubiergo (2007).
aSegura-Ubiergo (2007) compared the degree of civic and political mobilization in Peru as well as the 
state’s welfare spending with diverse Latin American states and found both to have increased over time 
but to remain low nonetheless.
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This finally leads us to speculate how state influence might affect hybridity. Based 
on the rationales of coordination (in the tradition of Weber’s [1921] understanding of 
bureaucracy) or competition (in the tradition of Coase’s [1937] understanding of the 
firm), the varieties of capitalism approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001) postulates that two 
main types of capitalism exist: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated 
market economies (CMEs). The main defining variable is the private sector’s ability to 
act (in)dependent of government influence. This approach has been empirically inves-
tigated and refined by Schneider and Paunescu (2012), who have added the categories 
of purely state-dominated, intermediate,3 and LME-like economies (see Table 3).
It is interesting that Schneider and Paunescu have found a stable allocation to the 
respective categories over the time period from 1990 to 2005 for some countries (e.g., 
Germany, United Kingdom, and United States) but a position shift from CME to LME-
like for Sweden, for instance. Although the (re-)allocation of countries points to insti-
tutional change, as Schneider and Paunescu assert and other authors have observed in 
more qualitative terms, the justification of this assertion by Schneider and Paunescu is 
mainly based on national comparative advantage in high-tech industries. Although this 
definition criterion is unrelated to our investigation, we have decided to take both posi-
tions into account for Sweden (its original and its new position).
Although this classification refers to industrial and service provision in commercial 
firms rather than social welfare provision, the implied state-economy link can provide 
general insights on the occurrence of welfare reform themes and their effects on 
hybridity. Strong state influence would lead us to expect that trends toward privatiza-
tion and marketization are being blocked. Thus, whereas commodification might be 
slowed, the very emergence of hybrid organizations might be as well (as in Germany). 
However, commodification is supposedly low only where structures are formal and 
strong and less so where these are weak (as is more likely the case for Eastern European 
or for developing countries like Peru).
Table 3. State Versus Market Dominance in National Contexts.
State (Orientation) Market (Orientation)
 
State-dominated 
economies
CMEs Intermediate 
economies
LME-like 
economies
LMEs
 Germany, 
(Sweden)a
Sweden, 
Perub
United Kingdom, 
United States
Note. CME = coordinated market economy; LME = liberal market economy. Based on Hall & Soskice 
(2001); Schneider & Paunescu (2012, p. 741); Wood & Gough (2006, p. 1705).
aAs mentioned in the text, Sweden has shifted from a CME position in the 1990s to an LME-like one in 
2005. bThe varieties of capitalism approach has been applied only to OECD countries. Since the ways that 
Wood and Gough (2006) use to describe the group of Latin American countries to which Peru belongs 
are similar to the institutional characteristics of LMEs described by both Hall and Soskice (2001) and 
Schneider and Paunescu (2012)—only not quite so strong—we have decided to allocate it generically 
to the “LME-like” category. Commonalities include disintegration of corporatist politics, labor market 
deregulation, and private financing of education.
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By contrast, competitive environments are more likely to be populated by a variety 
of different organizational forms. In combination with comparatively lower social 
welfare spending (see Table 2), the liberal market economies of the United States and 
the United Kingdom are more likely to produce network-like hybrid forms to compen-
sate for missing institutional structures. Network governance approaches thus promise 
to be fruitful in understanding hybrid organizational fields in these contexts, but less 
so in Germany, for example. In Germany, we would expect to find a more dispersed 
landscape of hybrid organizational entities. Also, these entities are supposed to affect 
the welfare regime—guided by the principle of subsidiarity—vertically (adding an 
additional layer of welfare providers) rather than horizontally (adding new players to 
the same layer) and would thus be analyzed more effectively by multilevel governance 
approaches rather than network governance approaches.
In Sweden, finally, hybrid entities are likely to be as scarce as are private/civic 
service providers in general. However, due to ongoing transformations, which the 
above classification suggests with regard to Sweden, hybridity is hard to assess against 
this specific national context. Based on its shifting position and the contradictions that 
result, Sweden is indeed an interesting case not only in terms of the organizational 
landscape of hybridity but also with regard to the application of hybrid processes such 
as coproduction. Although the traditional social-democratic welfare state conception 
would suggest that we would find a high degree of stakeholder involvement through 
coproduction within organizations (whereas coproduction is generally less likely in 
particular where stratification is high), the more recent view of Sweden as LME-like 
would predict a more market-oriented, competitive situation.
We will touch on these theoretical considerations in the presentation of the contri-
butions to this special issue and revisit them later to derive a concrete set of research 
propositions on hybridity from a comparative welfare perspective.
Contributions to This Special Issue
In his contribution, “Hybridity, Coproduction, and Third Sector Social Services in 
Europe,” Victor Pestoff explores the link between coproduction and hybridity. He 
asserts that coproduction and network governance are being fostered by what he calls 
the new public governance, which is equivalent to what we have labeled the post-NPM 
reform regime. Pestoff argues that third sector organizations are subject to tensions 
arising between their social value-oriented logic and the market-oriented NPM agenda 
(for instance, demanding professionalization or introducing competitive bidding pro-
cesses). In complex and dynamic environments, organizations have to employ differ-
ent institutional logics at different time points, with some organizations typically 
closer to one, some to the other. Pestoff argues that a “moving out of the comfort 
zone,” that is, engaging with unfamiliar institutional logics, creates hybridity and 
poses significant challenges to leadership and governance. Where organizational pro-
file and reform agenda are more similar to each other, tensions will be resolved more 
easily. He then relates this idea to coproduction, which he extends to comanagement 
and cogovernance. His example of how the idea of involving patients in health care 
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has resulted in a “patient-consumer” model in the United Kingdom (and similarly in 
Sweden) instead of “mass collaboration and participatory health care” highlights the 
tensions between organizational practices, reform themes, and welfare contexts with 
differing logics.
The contribution, “Hybrid Organizations in Social Service Delivery in Quasimarkets: 
The Case of Germany,” by Stephan Grohs looks at the NPM-driven introduction of 
quasimarket principles in the conservative and corporatist welfare system and coordi-
nated market economy of Germany. Grohs points out that the uniform reform wave 
has played out differently in different service fields, specifically youth welfare and 
care for the elderly. Based on distinct governance regimes, the two fields have differed 
in terms of openness to new entrants, organizational change of incumbents (third sec-
tor organizations), and modes of policy steering. An important variable has been the 
degree of decentralization (which applies to youth welfare, whereas care for the elderly 
remains a rather hierarchical field). Grohs interprets a disintegration of organizations 
into several entities as “dehybridization” and argues that this is more likely in hierar-
chical rather than decentralized field structures. This is somewhat at odds with our 
theoretical reasoning on welfare regimes but could be consistent when interpreted 
through the lenses of multilevel governance versus network governance (see research 
propositions below). The general observation remains that reform themes reverberate 
with context conditions, and both shape hybridity in very distinct ways.
In her contribution, “The Changing Governance of Education: A Comparative 
Political Economy Perspective on Hybridity,” Maria Balarin focuses on the field of 
education in England and Peru. Despite the extremely different historical background 
and socioeconomic status of the two countries, she finds that the NPM-like reform 
wave dominant in both—a move from what she refers to as a “Keynesian national 
welfare state regime” to a “Schumpeterian postnational workfare regime”—has led to 
very similar outcomes. Among these outcomes is the fragmentation and depolitization 
of education. As a consequence, education has become a commodity rather than a 
human ideal and a private rather than a public good, thus adding to the segregation of 
these societies. Although the outcomes as such are very similar, Balarin points out that 
their underlying mechanisms are different.
Christiane Schiersmann’s article, “Hybridity and Governance Changes in 
Continuing Education,” also relates to the field of education but focuses on continuing 
education—a naturally more commodified field—within the welfare state conception 
of Germany. Continuing education is particularly affected by legal ambiguity with 
unclear or overlapping regulations for funding, educational programs, staff, and the 
quality of services. The political and regulatory responsibility for the field is distrib-
uted across multiple layers of authority. Schiersmann shows how competitive funding 
from the European Union has substituted for continuous funding at the German (fed-
eral) state level and thereby adds to hybridity. One of the consequences is that actors 
are embracing economic practices affecting individuals (e.g., higher fees, as well as 
monetary incentives for individuals to participate) and the organizations themselves 
(e.g., competitive bidding for funds, requests for professional assistance in change 
management). Another consequence is the reorganization of the field by programs 
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initiated by the German government, the federal states, and the European Union, 
which aim at forming regional networks to foster interorganization synergies.
In their article, “Social Enterprises as an Embodiment of a Neoliberal Welfare 
Logic,” Eve Garrow and Yeheskel Hasenfeld touch on yet another distinct field, work 
integration—treating the social enterprises operating in it as examples of hybrid orga-
nizations. Here, they explicitly address the link between welfare regime and mission 
drift: commodification through the dominance of neoliberal welfare ideology. The 
particularity of work integration lies in the fact that clients are both beneficiaries and 
production workers. Drawing on neo-institutional theory, Garrow and Hasenfeld argue 
that the very emergence of work integration social enterprises (WISEs) is being prolif-
erated by neoliberal ideology, which has in some way taken precedence over alterna-
tive value systems such as the social-democratic logic. They assert that the underlying 
agenda undermines the rights of individuals and comes as “social in disguise” more 
often than not.
Finally, Steven Smith in his contribution, “Hybridity and Nonprofit Organizations: 
The Research Agenda,” advocates drawing on existing theory to enhance our under-
standing of hybridity. Smith roots hybridity in the combination of at least two different 
institutional logics, for example, competition versus community within a nonprofit 
organization. He asserts that the study of hybridity is complicated by the fact that some 
scholars see every organization as (partly) hybrid; that the delineation of sector inter-
sections is practically difficult if not impossible; and that hybridity research has been 
alienated from nonprofit theory, although it is mostly supposed to take place in organi-
zational fields typically populated by such kinds of organizations. Smith subsequently 
proposes areas of priority for research on hybridity, for example, legal and organiza-
tional form transitions through hybridity; programmatic innovation that fosters social 
innovation; or the relation between hybridity and market failure. Smith furthermore 
argues that insights on hybridity would be leveraged by drawing on institutional theory 
and on welfare state conceptions more broadly. In particular, the latter ambition and that 
of developing testable research propositions are the subjects of the next section.
Research Propositions
Merging theoretical considerations from the preceding sections with empirical evi-
dence from the articles allows us to formulate several explicit research propositions. 
Relating to Pestoff, when organizations are becoming hybrid by shifting positions—
encountering new institutional logics or adhering to a welfare reform stream—ten-
sions arise. These tensions can be productive or destructive with regard to the stability 
of hybridity as an organizational and field phenomenon. Among the most pronounced 
destructive effects are mission drift or single stakeholder dominance, invited through 
commodification, clientelism, or both. One of the most productive effects is coproduc-
tion, the common engagement of a multitude of stakeholders. However, not only will 
the prevalence of hybridity and the factors influencing its stability be affected by the 
surrounding welfare regime and economy, but also the modes of governance applied. 
We expect to find differences in whether hybridity predominantly takes place across 
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organizations (best analyzed as network governance) or along the multiple layers of 
the welfare provision system (best analyzed as multilevel governance).
Garrow and Hasenfeld generally assert that market logic is currently stronger than 
social logic, which has consequences for assessing the occurrence of hybridity. We can 
expect hybrids to be particularly numerous in contexts that are more open to accepting 
economic influence both in social welfare and in policy. Where field logics and wel-
fare regimes are more at odds with economized reform themes, hybrids will be less 
numerous.
Proposition 1: Hybridity is more likely to occur in liberal market-oriented econo-
mies/welfare regimes than other regime types.
However, following our previous thinking further, these contexts will also pose 
the biggest challenges for the stability of hybridity. Where the institutional logics of 
economized organizational change reverberate with those of fields or welfare sys-
tems in place, there is an increased risk of mission drift back to a single-purpose 
entity or single stakeholder dominance. Balarin demonstrates this for the field of 
education in two countries that are very different at face value. If we go back to our 
welfare state discussion, though, we see that they have a lot in common: a liberal(-
informal) welfare regime and an LME(-like) economy. Where this constellation 
comes into contact with ideologically close reform ideas, the rise of hybridity bring-
ing new practices into education finally dissolves into a one-sided agenda—which is 
effectively a move from education as a predominantly collective good to a hybrid 
good to a competitive good—with potentially adverse effects. One of these effects is 
the exacerbation of educational inequalities where social stratification was already 
high. Whereas the main underlying mechanism in England (with a high degree of 
institutional density and a democratic tradition) is commodification, the connection 
works via increased clientelism in a more informal (i.e., unstructured) and formerly 
authoritarian welfare system and economy like Peru. This circumstance ultimately 
pushed aside the “good governance” agenda that had been promoted by international 
organizations and the decentralization policies of the postauthoritarian government 
in Peru after 2001.
Garrow and Hasenfeld take this one step further. They show how neoliberalism in 
the United States and Europe affects and partly perverts the very logic of remedying 
social ills through the mechanisms that have caused these ills in the first place. Some 
ideologies have such overriding force that they crowd out alternative welfare con-
cepts such as social-democratic logic, the authors argue. This comes with shifts of 
responsibility from the collective to the individual linked to marketization and 
privatization. Work integration social enterprises, they imply further, are a hybrid 
vehicle for transporting ideas that are becoming increasingly dominant and do not 
contribute to a sustainable construct of social and economic elements but rather 
subvert the sphere of welfare into that of the market. In some contexts, especially 
with regard to the Third Way that has been most strongly embraced in the United 
Kingdom (Giddens, 1998), this has been more effective than in other contexts. 
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Thereby, success according to market logic (i.e., profitability) increases isomorphic 
pressures to effectively operate like a business rather than a welfare provider. Garrow 
and Hasenfeld’s application of embeddedness as a critical trigger for either main-
taining balance in hybridity or giving way to mission drift reconciles with our dis-
cussion of different welfare state classifications, where the descriptive variables 
indicate dominant streams of influence.
The evidence referred to above leads us to posit the following two research 
propositions:
Proposition 2: Hybrids in liberal market-oriented regimes are most likely to suffer 
from mission drift to a single objective due to market pressures.
Proposition 3: Hybrids in statist/informal market-oriented economies/welfare 
regimes are most likely to suffer from single stakeholder dominance due to political 
pressures.
Following from this, hybrid practices like coproduction are more likely to be 
applied in organizations that equally resonate with its underlying values, taking into 
account that coproduction will strive where power distance between individuals is low 
and solidarity is a pronounced ideal. The same can be assumed in relation to welfare 
contexts. If applied in systems governed by existing institutional logics that are poten-
tially in conflict with participatory reform agendas, hybrid practices will look differ-
ent. We do not suggest that, for example, coproduction will not occur in more 
economized welfare states and economies at all, however, the latter are likely to pro-
duce an altered and potentially corrupted version of intended effects (see Pestoff’s 
example of coproduction in the United Kingdom turning into a patient-consumer 
model).
Proposition 4: Coproducing hybrids are more likely in social-democratic welfare 
regimes, but only if market pressures remain weak to moderate.
In addition to differences in the occurrence and stability of hybridity, there are dif-
ferent approaches to the governance of hybridity in relation to welfare contexts. 
Schiersmann shows how competitive elements put organizations in adult education in 
Germany under pressure. Instead of giving way to mission drift and despite com-
plaints about tensions between economic practices and educational vocation, these 
organizations seek professional assistance in managing necessary change. Another 
strategy to cope with the challenges of hybridity is the formation of network struc-
tures. Mostly, however, they do not seem to grow organically but are initiated by 
regional, federal, or EU government. Actor networks thereby become another layer in 
the multilevel governance of hybridity in conservative corporatist welfare systems and 
coordinated market economies. Thus,
Proposition 5: Hybridity is most likely to form institutional multilevel governance 
structures in conservative, state-oriented economies/welfare regimes.
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This proposition—like the others—is of course subject to field-specific tendencies 
that can alter or reinforce the dominant characteristics of the welfare regime in ques-
tion. As the contribution of Grohs suggests, the effect of fields is probably more imme-
diate but, we would argue, weaker than that of the welfare regime. What is more, 
although according to Grohs, hierarchical organizational or policy fields are more 
likely to be affected by tensions leading to the disintegration of hybrid organizations, 
this could be interpreted as contributing to multilevel governance structures of hybrid-
ity rather than dehybridization, if regarded from the viewpoint of an organizational 
corporate structure rather than that of independent organizational divisions. By con-
trast, decentralized fields are more likely to preserve the “amalgamation of logics,” as 
Grohs puts it. Since we keep focusing on the field characteristics, we could argue that 
this happens through networks between organizations rather than within single organi-
zations. Both ideas are implied but are insufficiently spelled out by Grohs’ comment 
that disintegration could be “an attempt to perpetuate the hybridity of the umbrella 
organizations by reducing the degree of hybridity of its parts.” Smith similarly 
describes the formation of subsidies as “structural innovation” and interprets it as an 
effect of hybridity. What is more, in contrast to Grohs, Garrow and Hasenfeld assert 
that system devolution adds to mission drift rather than to preservation of hybridity. It 
is becoming evident that there is a difference between the general prevalence of the 
phenomenon, how hybridity plays out within organizational corporate structures or 
single entities, and how it affects constellations in organizational fields.
It seems fruitful to consider two variables in addition to the ones initially proposed: 
centralization and decentralization of systems and especially of organizational fields. 
Their actual effect is harder to judge than that of the other variables, since we find 
inconclusive evidence in the contributions to this special issue. Against the back-
ground of our previous reasoning, we nonetheless deduce that naturally grown net-
work structures are not very likely in state-dominated contexts. They are more likely 
in liberal welfare traditions, less as an expression of adherence with the post-NPM 
ideal of collective governance but rather as a means to enhance market positions or to 
coopt users (compare to Pestoff’s argument in relation to Martin, 2011, for the latter). 
In parallel with the proposition on coproduction, networks seem most likely to be 
genuinely fostered in social-democratic regimes.
Proposition 6: Hybridity is most likely to form organizational network governance 
structures in liberal and social-democratic market-oriented economies/welfare 
regimes.
Smith points to several unresolved issues in hybridity research that are directly 
relevant to the developed propositions. For instance, the likely mission drift toward 
markets in some contexts and the general shift inherent in hybridity more generally 
evoke questions about the source and stability of legitimacy of hybridity. What replaces 
the nondistribution constraint that is being partially removed, and how is political 
legitimacy formed by hybrid nonprofits when market mechanisms are being embraced 
and when market failure is one of the very reasons for their existence? Although we 
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have mainly focused on a static analysis of the connection between context and hybrid-
ity, Smith is right in pointing out that life-cycle theory, of both organizations and 
fields, could enhance the intertemporal (i.e., dynamic) perspective on hybridity.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article and the entire special issue is to posit propositions that can 
be useful—though tentative—points of departure for future research. We believe that 
the propositions introduced are valuable for investigating hybridity at the level of the 
welfare state but can be transferred to the field level too. Whether welfare and field 
level logics actually resonate with or oppose one another remains to be explored in 
further empirical research. The same applies to organizational, field, and welfare state 
dynamism.
We encourage more targeted investigations on the connections between hybridity 
and context conditions at different levels of analysis. Moreover, the future direction 
and the explanatory potential of research will depend on how hybridity is being 
analyzed.
One can look at hybrids according to the mere existence of multiple actors and 
stakeholders in fields or organizations or the prevalence of multiple objectives within 
fields or organizations. Alternatively, hybrids can be defined by the direct involvement 
of multiple stakeholders with agency and their pursuit of multiple objectives with 
varying intensity and dominance over time. Although the former understanding is 
regularly applied, we advocate the latter definition since it specifies a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for hybridity and thereby brings more conceptual and method-
ological rigor to the investigation of the phenomenon.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank all peer-reviewers who have invested their time and effort in comment-
ing on the contributions to this special issue.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, 
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) declared receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, 
and/or publication of this article: This special issue resulted from a symposium on “governance 
and leadership in hybrid organizations” held at the Centre for Social Investment of the University 
of Heidelberg in December 2011. The symposium was funded by StiftungVolkswagen under 
grant agreement number 85317.
Notes
1. One of numerous examples is the “Big Society” agenda shaping welfare policies in the 
United Kingdom.
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2. See, for instance, Brandsen, Larsson, and Nordfeldt (2012) on historical and institutional 
trends affecting local welfare systems.
3. Schneider and Paunescu (2012) use the term hybrid to denote the position of an in-between 
state with regard to the distinct categories on the scale. To avoid confusion and due to 
equivalent meaning here, we are using the term intermediate.
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